Sfetcu, Nicolae (2025), European Union Strategies for Technological Advancement in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape, IT & C, 4:2, DOI: 10.58679/IT67702, https://www.internetmobile.ro/european-union-strategies-for-technological-advancement-in-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape/

Abstract

The European Union (EU) increasingly views technological capability as a cornerstone of its strategic autonomy amid global power shifts. Major technology domains – from artificial intelligence and semiconductors to green tech, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and space – have become arenas for geopolitical competition and cooperation. In response, the EU has launched comprehensive policies and investments to manage and advance its technological resources. These efforts are driven by a recognition that leadership in technology underpins economic strength, security, and resilience in the face of challenges such as the U.S.–China tech rivalry, supply chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and the need for transatlantic coordination. This article provides an analysis of the EU’s strategies across key tech domains and examines how policy initiatives align with current geopolitical challenges.

Keywords: European Union, EU, technology, geopolitics, artificial intelligence, semiconductors, green tech, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, space

Strategiile Uniunii Europene pentru progresul tehnologic într-un peisaj geopolitic în schimbare

Rezumat

Uniunea Europeană (UE) consideră din ce în ce mai mult capacitatea tehnologică ca pe o piatră de temelie a autonomiei sale strategice pe fondul schimbărilor globale de putere. Domeniile tehnologice majore – de la inteligența artificială și semiconductori până la tehnologia verde, infrastructura digitală, securitatea cibernetică și spațiul – au devenit arene pentru competiția și cooperarea geopolitică. Ca răspuns, UE a lansat politici și investiții cuprinzătoare pentru a-și gestiona și promova resursele tehnologice. Aceste eforturi sunt conduse de recunoașterea faptului că conducerea în tehnologie sprijină puterea economică, securitatea și rezistența în fața unor provocări precum rivalitatea tehnologică dintre SUA și China, întreruperile lanțului de aprovizionare, războiul din Ucraina și nevoia de coordonare transatlantică. Acest articol oferă o analiză a strategiilor UE în domeniile tehnologice cheie, și examinează modul în care inițiativele politice se aliniază la provocările geopolitice actuale.

Cuvinte cheie: Uniunea Europeană, UE, tehnologie, geopolitică, inteligență artificială, semiconductori, tehnologie verde, infrastructură digitală, securitate cibernetică, spațiu

IT & C, Volumul 4, Numărul 1, Martie 2025, pp. xxx
ISSN 2821 – 8469, ISSN – L 2821 – 8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT67702
URL: https://www.internetmobile.ro/european-union-strategies-for-technological-advancement-in-a-shifting-geopolitical-landscape/
© 2025 Nicolae Sfetcu. Responsabilitatea conținutului, interpretărilor și opiniilor exprimate revine exclusiv autorilor.

European Union Strategies for Technological Advancement in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

Nicolae SFETCU[1]
nicolae@sfetcu.com

[1] Researcher – Romanian Academy (Romanian Committee of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (CRIFST), Division of History of Science (DIS)), ORCID: 0000-0002-0162-9973

Introduction

The European Union (EU) increasingly views technological capability as a cornerstone of its strategic autonomy amid global power shifts, and a key driver of economic growth, competitiveness and social well-being. Major technology domains – from artificial intelligence and semiconductors to green tech, digital infrastructure, cybersecurity, and space – have become arenas for geopolitical competition and cooperation. In response, the EU has launched comprehensive policies and investments to manage and advance its technological resources. These efforts are driven by a recognition that leadership in technology underpins economic strength, security, and resilience in the face of challenges such as the U.S.–China tech rivalry, supply chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, and the need for transatlantic coordination. Over the past two decades, the EU has launched a series of policies and frameworks governing technological development, digital transformation and innovation in its Member States.

EU Technology Policy in a Geopolitical Context

The EU’s approach to technology is framed by its ambition for “open strategic autonomy,” which seeks to reduce critical dependencies while remaining open to global trade (Arcesati 2024) (European Commission 2025c). Europe has learned from recent crises – including pandemic-era supply shocks and energy insecurity amid the Ukraine war – that it must bolster its own tech capabilities. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has emphasized the need to “de-risk” critical technology sectors (like semiconductors, AI, quantum computing and biotech) from over-reliance on any single foreign supplier (Arcesati 2024). This doctrine steers EU policies toward strengthening domestic production, diversifying supply chains, and securing partnerships with like-minded allies. It also underpins initiatives such as tighter foreign investment screening and export controls coordinated with partners, ensuring that Europe’s pursuit of tech sovereignty does not lapse into isolationism (European Commission 2025c). In practice, the EU’s evolving tech governance blends regulation and investment: it leverages its regulatory power to set global standards, and it directs substantial funding into research and infrastructure to fuel innovation. The following sections outline how this strategy plays out in specific domains.

Strategies by Technology Domain

The EU has prioritized digital innovation to boost economic growth and maintain its global competitiveness. The Digital Single Market Strategy (DSM), (European Commission 2019) launched in 2015, aims to ensure seamless access to online activities and services across Europe, while supporting infrastructure development and digital entrepreneurship. DSM helps to remove regulatory barriers and create a unified digital space, allowing companies and citizens to freely participate in digital trade and innovation. By standardizing digital regulations, the EU intends to stimulate startups and the scaling up of technology, creating an interconnected network of digital businesses.

Another crucial aspect is Horizon Europe, (European Commission 2024g) the EU’s key funding program for research and innovation. In the period 2021-2027, it allocates significant resources to technological innovation, encouraging collaborations between research institutions, companies and public bodies. With a focus on artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing and blockchain, Horizon Europe seeks to ensure that Europe remains at the forefront of technological advancement.

Artificial Intelligence

The EU has adopted a distinctive strategy on artificial intelligence (AI) centered on trustworthy and human-centric AI. A flagship initiative is the EU AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive AI legislation, which aims to address AI risks and position Europe as a global leader in AI governance (European Commission 2025a). The AI Act establishes a risk-based framework: it imposes strict requirements (or even bans) on high-risk AI applications (such as biometric surveillance or AI in hiring decisions) while leaving most low-risk AI largely unregulated (European Commission 2025a). By fostering “trustworthy AI,” the EU hopes to encourage innovation by ensuring societal acceptance and legal clarity (European Commission 2025a). This regulatory approach is complemented by investments: the EU’s Coordinated Plan on AI and AI Innovation Program channel funding into AI research, testbeds (“AI sandboxes”), and digital skills to spur adoption across industries (European Commission 2025a). Through these measures, Europe seeks to close its gap with the U.S. and China in AI development, leveraging its single market and value-driven rules as a competitive advantage. Notably, the EU and U.S. have begun coordinating on AI under the Trade and Technology Council (TTC), aligning on terminology and risk management approaches in areas like AI safety research (European Commission 2025c). By proactively shaping AI standards, the EU aims to export its regulatory model globally – a strategy often referred to as the “Brussels effect.”

Semiconductors

Recent semiconductor shortages and geopolitical frictions have spotlighted Europe’s vulnerabilities in the chip supply chain (European Commission 2024d). The EU produces only about 10% of the world’s microchips (European Commission 2024d), relying heavily on a few Asian and U.S. suppliers. To address this, the EU enacted the European Chips Act in 2023. This initiative will mobilize over €43 billion in public and private investment to “bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies” (European Commission 2024d). The Chips Act has multiple pillars: a “Chips for Europe” Initiative to fund R&D and innovation in areas like next-generation processors, a framework to incentivize new chip fabrication plants in Europe (with a goal to double EU global market share to 20% by 2030 (European Commission 2024d), and a coordination mechanism for monitoring supply and demand shocks (European Commission 2024d) (European Commission 2024d). Already, Europe is connecting its world-class research centers and chipmakers to attract “first-of-a-kind” production facilities on European soil (European Commission 2024d). For instance, new semiconductor fabs and expansions have been announced in Germany, France, and Italy under this Act’s encouragement. The Chips Act also explicitly ties into geopolitical cooperation – it calls for working with international partners to address future supply disruptions (European Commission 2024d). Through the TTC, the EU and U.S. have agreed to coordinate on semiconductor supply chain security and to align export controls on advanced chips (European Commission 2025c). In sum, Europe’s semiconductor strategy mixes industrial policy with alliance-building to achieve what officials term “technological sovereignty” in this critical domain (European Commission 2024d).

Green Technology and Clean Energy

A notable aspect of EU technology policy is its alignment with environmental sustainability goals. The EU Green Deal, (European Commission 2021) which aims for climate neutrality by 2050, places emphasis on harnessing digital technology to achieve these goals. The EU is actively promoting green ICT solutions, such as energy-efficient data centers and green digital infrastructure, as part of a broader objective to minimize the environmental footprint of technology resources.

EU investments have enabled more electricity to be produced from wind power than from gas by 2023. Further targets are to double cross-border electricity transmission capacity and deploy smart grids and charging infrastructure. (Comisia Europeană 2024)

As part of the EU’s dual digital and green transition, the bloc is heavily investing in green technology – not only to meet climate targets but also to enhance energy security in a tumultuous geopolitical climate. The cornerstone is the European Green Deal and its industrial policy offshoot, the Green Deal Industrial Plan (GDIP). Announced in 2023 partly in response to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, the GDIP aims to “put Europe’s net-zero industry in the lead” by creating a supportive environment for scaling up clean-tech manufacturing (European Commission 2025e). It includes a proposed Net-Zero Industry Act to streamline regulations and set 2030 targets for EU-based production of key technologies like batteries, wind turbines, solar panels, and electrolyzers (European Commission 2025e). Another component is the Critical Raw Materials Act to secure supply of rare earths and minerals vital for green tech, reducing dependence on imports from countries like China (European Commission 2025e). To accelerate deployment, the EU has also relaxed state aid rules and reallocated funding instruments – for example, repurposing recovery funds (NextGenerationEU) toward renewable energy and clean tech projects (European Commission 2025e). These efforts have been amplified by the war in Ukraine, which underscored the strategic imperative of energy independence. In 2022, the EU launched the REPowerEU plan to rapidly diversify away from Russian fossil fuels by speeding up renewables and energy efficiency. Consequently, EU countries invested a record €110 billion in renewable energy in 2023, a significant surge spurred in part by high energy prices and security concerns (Holman and Lefort 2024). Europe now spends ten times more on clean energy than on fossil fuels, reflecting a “stiffened resolve” to transition to green energy and end reliance on foreign fuel sources (Holman and Lefort 2024). By raising 2030 renewables targets (from 40% to 45% of energy share) and funding green innovation, the EU is using climate policy as a lever for geopolitical resilience (GlobSec 2023). In summary, Europe’s green technology strategy combines ambitious climate action with industrial policy tools to ensure it remains both a leader in climate innovation and less beholden to external energy shocks.

Digital Infrastructure and Connectivity

Advanced digital infrastructure is another pillar of Europe’s tech strategy, forming the backbone for competitiveness in all other domains. The EU’s Digital Decade program sets targets for 2030: for example, gigabit broadband for all households and 5G (and future 6G) coverage for all populated areas (EU Monitor 2025). Progress is being made, but with significant disparities across the Union. Overall, basic broadband access is nearly universal, yet only 70% of EU households have access to very high-capacity networks (e.g. fiber) and about 66% of populated areas had 5G coverage as of 2021 (EU Monitor 2025). Leading countries like Malta, Luxembourg, and Denmark enjoy over 90% gigabit network coverage, whereas in Greece barely 20% of households have the same access (EU Monitor 2025). To close such gaps, EU funds (Cohesion Funds, Connecting Europe Facility) and national recovery plans are heavily financing broadband rollouts, particularly in underserved rural or remote regions. The EU also emphasizes secure digital infrastructure. It issued a 5G Security Toolbox that guides member states to limit “high-risk” vendors (implicitly targeting untrusted suppliers from China) and diversify equipment providers (European Commission 2025b). Many member states have since imposed restrictions on 5G gear from companies deemed security risks, reflecting a unified approach to safeguarding critical networks (European Commission 2025b).Furthermore, Europe is preparing for 6G by investing in research and by early transatlantic coordination – the April 2024 TTC meeting adopted a common EU–US 6G vision and launched joint research cooperation on future network technologies (European Commission 2025c). In digital infrastructure, as elsewhere, the EU strategy pairs internal development with external collaboration: building world-class connectivity at home while working with allies on standards and security to ensure an open yet resilient digital ecosystem.

Cybersecurity

The EU approach to technology governance also includes robust cybersecurity policies. The 2019 Cybersecurity Act introduced the EU Cybersecurity Certification Framework, which establishes certification schemes for ICT products to strengthen their security features (EUR-Lex 2019). This policy aims to increase trust in digital services and ensure that digital infrastructure in Member States complies with strict security requirements.

In addition, the NIS2 Directive (Network and Information Systems Directive) expands on its predecessor (NIS Directive) to address emerging cyber threats. (European Commission 2024b) Adopted in 2022, the NIS2 Directive sets higher security standards for critical infrastructure, including the health, energy and transport sectors, to reduce vulnerabilities across the EU.

Rising cyber threats from state actors and criminals have propelled cybersecurity to the top of the EU agenda, especially following Russian cyberattacks associated with the Ukraine war. The EU’s approach to cybersecurity is multi-faceted: updating legislation, boosting capacities, and improving coordination. A key recent step is the NIS2 Directive (adopted 2022), which requires all member states to enforce higher cybersecurity standards across 18 critical sectors, from energy and transport to health and finance (ENISA 2023). NIS2 broadens the scope of mandatory cyber risk management and incident reporting, creating a unified baseline of resilience across Europe (ENISA 2023). Additionally, the EU established a new Cybersecurity Competence Centre in Bucharest in 2023 to pool expertise and drive innovation in cyber defense technologies (Mihai 2023). Through this center and funding under the Digital Europe and Horizon Europe programs, the EU is investing in areas like advanced cryptography, secure hardware, and cybersecurity skills development (European Commission 2025b). Indeed, addressing the cyber skills shortage is recognized as crucial: the Commission launched a Cyber Skills Academy and encourages member states to include cybersecurity training in their digital upskilling initiatives (European Commission 2025b). In terms of strategy, the EU released an updated Cybersecurity Strategy aligning civilian and defense measures, calling for “full-spectrum cyber defense capabilities” and greater cooperation between EU cyber agencies and the military domain (European Commission 2025b). This has led to closer EU–NATO collaboration on cyber incidents and joint exercises. Moreover, the EU and U.S. have deepened cyber cooperation via information-sharing and coordinated responses to ransomware and other threats as affirmed in TTC talks. By strengthening its cyber resilience and working with allies, the EU aims to protect its digital sovereignty against espionage, sabotage, and election interference. The focus on securing hospitals, energy grids, and other critical infrastructure has only intensified since 2022, given real-world hybrid attacks witnessed in Ukraine and Europe’s own heightened threat environment (European Commission 2025b).

Space and Satellite Technology

Space is an increasingly strategic technology domain where the EU seeks both autonomy and global leadership. The EU Space Programme integrates several flagship projects that ensure Europe’s independent access to critical space-based services. Notably, Galileo (the EU’s satellite navigation system) and Copernicus (the EU’s Earth observation system) provide the bloc with its own high-precision positioning and earth-monitoring data, reducing reliance on foreign systems like GPS (BMDV 2021). Galileo has been fully operational, offering positioning accuracy often better than GPS, and is used in everything from smartphones to critical infrastructure across Europe. Copernicus, with a fleet of Sentinel satellites, delivers environmental and security-related data (e.g. for climate change monitoring or disaster response) that underpins both commercial applications and policy decisions. The strategic value of these systems is clear: the EU considers secure access to space data as part of its “strategic independence” (BMDV 2021). Building on these successes, the EU has approved IRIS², a new multi-orbit satellite constellation for secure communications. With a planned ~290 satellites in low and medium Earth orbit, IRIS² (Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity and Security by Satellite) is set to provide encrypted connectivity for governments, military, and critical services, as well as broadband access for remote areas (European Commission 2025d). Launched in 2024 with a €10+ billion budget, IRIS² is explicitly framed as strengthening Europe’s autonomy in the face of growing cyber and hybrid threats, ensuring secure links even during crises (European Commission 2025d). In parallel, the EU works closely with the European Space Agency (ESA) and national space agencies to maintain independent launch capabilities (e.g. the new Ariane 6 rocket) and to foster a competitive space industry. The past year saw urgency in restoring European launch autonomy after reliance on non-European launchers due to delays in Ariane 6 – a situation Europe is addressing to avoid strategic gaps in putting satellites into orbit (Foust 2025) (France 24 2025). Overall, through investments in satellite infrastructure and coordination of space policy, the EU aims to secure its position in a domain increasingly intertwined with geopolitics and defense. Space technology is both an enabler of other digital services and a field of competition (with actors like the U.S., China, and private companies); the EU’s strategy is to be a leader in the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space while safeguarding its own access and assets.

The EU as a technology leader

The EU’s policies and frameworks on technology resources present a comprehensive and forward-looking approach to digital transformation. Through initiatives such as the Digital Single Market, Horizon Europe, the GDPR and the Cybersecurity Act, the EU seeks to foster innovation while ensuring data protection, cybersecurity and digital sovereignty. These policies reflect the EU’s broader ambition to become a technology leader, retaining control over key technological resources, while promoting a green and inclusive digital economy.

Navigating Geopolitical Challenges

U.S.–China Tech Rivalry and “Strategic Autonomy”

The intense tech competition between the United States and China forms the backdrop for many EU initiatives. Europe’s stance has been to avoid being squeezed between two superpowers by pursuing its own path – strategic autonomy – in critical technologies (Arcesati 2024). This does not mean equidistance: the EU is closely aligned with the U.S. on values and has deep trade and research ties with America. But it also maintains economic links with China that it is reluctant to sever. Thus, the EU’s paradigm is “de-risking, not decoupling” from China  (Arcesati 2024). In practice, the EU is tightening oversight on Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors (like 5G, semiconductors, and critical raw materials) and screening investments for security risks, while still engaging China on trade and climate. For instance, multiple EU countries followed the U.S. lead in restricting Chinese telecom vendors in 5G networks to mitigate security concerns (European Commission 2025b). The EU is also developing tools like export controls on dual-use tech and considering outbound investment screening to prevent European capital or expertise from boosting rivals’ military capabilities  (Arcesati 2024). At the same time, Europe distinguishes its approach by remaining open: it continues collaboration with China in non-sensitive areas and keeps dialogue through mechanisms like the EU–China High-Level Digital Dialogue. The U.S.–EU partnership has strengthened under the Biden administration, especially via the Trade and Technology Council, which provides a forum to align transatlantic tech policies. Through the TTC, Brussels and Washington have coordinated on semiconductor supply chains, AI ethics, data governance, and export restrictions on advanced tech to authoritarian regimes (European Commission 2025c). This coordination helps present a united front in setting democratic norms against China’s state-led tech model. Still, tensions exist – for example, European industries sometimes chafe at U.S. extraterritorial sanctions or at potential disadvantages from U.S.-centric supply chains. Thus, EU strategic autonomy also means building capacity to act independently when interests diverge. Summarily, the EU’s navigation of the U.S.–China rivalry involves a delicate balance: reinforcing the Western alliance in technology-standard setting and defense, while asserting Europe’s ability to make sovereign decisions and invest in its own tech champions.

Global Supply Chain Disruptions

The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent supply chain crises (notably the semiconductor crunch) exposed Europe’s dependency on global production networks. In response, the EU has pivoted to policies that promote resilience and diversification of supply chains for critical technologies. The aforementioned Chips Act is a prime example, aiming to onshore more semiconductor manufacturing and reduce the risk of future chip shortages crippling European industries (European Commission 2024d). Similarly, the EU’s Critical Raw Materials strategy addresses vulnerabilities in imports of lithium, rare earths, and other materials essential for batteries, wind turbines, and electronics (European Commission 2025e). Europe currently sources many of these from a few countries (often China); the new act sets targets to extract and process more materials domestically or from trusted partners, and to stockpile reserves (European Commission 2025e). The EU is also fostering “friend-shoring” – shifting supply dependence from rivals to allies. Initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership and prospective EU–Australia or EU–Canada agreements on critical minerals exemplify this approach (European Commission 2025c). Additionally, the EU’s trade policy has tilted toward securing free trade agreements (FTAs) that include robust supply chain provisions (for example, recent or upcoming FTAs with countries like Japan, South Korea, and Chile help ensure access to tech components and resources). Another lesson from recent disruptions is the importance of monitoring and early warning. The EU set up industrial alliances (e.g. on batteries, hydrogen, cloud computing) that bring together companies and governments to identify bottlenecks and coordinate investments. Under the Single Market Emergency Instrument, Brussels is proposing powers to map supply risks and even compel stockpiling or reallocation of key products in a crisis. Such measures are controversial but signal how seriously the EU now treats supply chain security as part of its technological strategy. In summary, Europe is mitigating global supply risks by boosting local production, diversifying import sources, and instituting mechanisms for crisis management – all aimed at keeping the flow of critical tech inputs steady in an unpredictable world.

War in Ukraine and Security Imperatives

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had far-reaching implications for the EU’s tech and innovation policies. First and foremost was energy: Europe swiftly realized it had to accelerate deployment of clean energy technology to break free from Russian fossil fuels. The war catalyzed the REPowerEU plan, which, as noted, turbocharged investments in renewables, grids, and energy storage (Holman and Lefort 2024). This urgent push not only serves climate goals but also deprives a hostile power of leverage – a vivid instance of geopolitics driving tech adoption. By 2023, the EU had largely replaced Russian gas, thanks in part to a 25% jump in wind and solar capacity in just two years (2020–2022) (European Commission 2025e). The war also refocused attention on cybersecurity and defense technology. European infrastructure, government institutions, and companies have faced heightened cyber attacks (from Russian-linked actors) since the war began, leading to greater EU-NATO cyber coordination and new EU initiatives like joint cyber rapid response teams. The European Cybersecurity Strategy put forward in 2022 explicitly links the geopolitical context to cyber readiness, urging investment in full-spectrum cyber defense and closer civil-military cooperation (European Commission 2025b). On the military tech side, the conflict spurred EU countries to increase defense R&D spending and collaborate on developing advanced capabilities (drones, secure communication systems, anti-missile defenses, etc.). The EU’s European Defence Fund, which finances joint R&D for defense technologies, saw a boost in both funding and political support. Another consequence of the war is the emphasis on secure communications and space-based surveillance. EU institutions have been using Copernicus satellite imagery to monitor the war and track events (like potential war crimes or environmental damage), showcasing the value of Europe’s own space assets. It’s no coincidence that IRIS², the secure satcom project, gained momentum in this period – the war underscored the need for protected, independent channels of government communication in Europe (European Commission 2025d). Finally, the Ukraine war reinforced transatlantic tech cooperation: the U.S. and EU closely coordinated on export controls for cutting-edge technologies to Russia (e.g. high-end semiconductors, aircraft parts), effectively leveraging Western dominance in key tech niches as an economic weapon. In essence, the conflict has accelerated EU efforts to shore up technological security across energy, cyber, defense, and space, aligning tech strategy even more closely with foreign and security policy.

Transatlantic Tech Coordination

The partnership with the United States is a critical axis of the EU’s technology strategy in the current geopolitical landscape. After some turbulence in previous years (e.g. disputes over digital taxation or U.S. surveillance concerns), EU–U.S. relations have markedly improved in the tech domain. The creation of the Trade and Technology Council (TTC) in 2021 was a milestone, establishing working groups on semiconductor supply chains, AI, tech standards, data governance, and more (European Commission 2025c). Through a series of high-level meetings, the TTC has yielded joint statements and “alignment” in various areas: for example, a commitment to a risk-based approach to AI and collaboration on AI R&D for societal benefit (European Commission 2025c); an agreement on common principles for 6G development (European Commission 2025c); extended cooperation on chip supply chain monitoring and a subsidy transparency dialogue to avoid a zero-sum subsidy race (European Commission 2025c); and coordinated efforts on screening investments and exports to protect sensitive technologies (European Commission 2025c). While the TTC is not a binding treaty body, it has improved communication and prevented missteps – for instance, it helped the EU and U.S. move towards a critical minerals agreement so that European electric cars can qualify under the U.S. clean vehicle subsidies (mitigating a trade tension) (European Commission 2025c). Beyond the TTC, EU–U.S. coordination is evident in their united front on technology sanctions (against Russia and potentially against human rights-violating uses of tech) and in renewed negotiations on a Data Privacy Framework to facilitate EU–U.S. data flows with stronger protections after the invalidation of the previous Privacy Shield. The transatlantic alliance in tech is also framed as a way to uphold democratic values: together they have launched initiatives to counter online disinformation and enforce norms for technology use that respect human rights (European Commission 2025c). Nonetheless, the EU maintains its own regulatory path (as seen in the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, AI Act, etc.), which sometimes pressures U.S. tech firms to change practices globally. This dynamic – cooperative but with healthy tension – is likely to continue. In sum, transatlantic coordination has become an essential part of how the EU advances its tech interests, ensuring that Western democracies remain technologically competitive and norm-setting in the face of authoritarian models.

Digital sovereignty and technological autonomy

A cornerstone of EU policy is the achievement of digital sovereignty, which is the EU’s ability to govern its digital resources independently. The European Data Strategy, (European Commission 2024a) unveiled in 2020, focuses on establishing a unified data space that promotes safe and reliable data sharing practices between Member States (European Commission 2024g). This strategy is designed to reduce dependence on non-EU service providers, ensuring that data produced in Europe stays in Europe, ultimately preserving the privacy and control of EU citizens over their information.

GAIA-X, (European Commission 2024f) an initiative launched by Germany and France, embodies the EU’s approach to cloud sovereignty. GAIA-X aims to develop a secure and federated data infrastructure, ensuring that EU data storage and processing solutions are aligned with European standards and ensuring control over critical digital resources. This project illustrates the EU’s efforts to promote autonomy over essential technological resources and prevent over-reliance on foreign cloud service providers.

Data Governance and Regulation

The EU has also been a global leader in data regulation. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force in 2018, is one of the strictest data privacy laws in the world. (European Commission 2024c) The GDPR imposes strict rules on data handling, giving individuals more control over their data and imposing significant fines for breaches. This regulation not only protects citizens, but also sets a global benchmark, influencing data governance policies beyond Europe.

Building on the GDPR, the Data Governance Act (DGA) aims to further improve data sharing while ensuring that non-personal data remains protected. (European Commission 2024e) The DGA, adopted in 2021, provides a framework for data intermediaries and aims to encourage the reuse of data for public benefit, such as in health research and climate change. This framework facilitates the sharing of trusted data across sectors, while safeguarding transparency and accountability.

Conclusion

The European Union’s strategy for managing and advancing technological resources is multifaceted and deeply intertwined with the current geopolitical context. Across AI, semiconductors, green tech, digital networks, cybersecurity, and space, the EU has rolled out ambitious policies that seek to boost innovation, ensure security, and uphold European values. Legislation like the AI Act and NIS2, massive funding programs like the Chips Act and Green Deal Industrial Plan, and visionary projects such as Galileo and IRIS² all reflect a Union gearing up for an era in which technological prowess equates to geopolitical influence. These initiatives are not pursued in isolation: they are responses to external pressures – navigating great-power tech rivalry without losing strategic autonomy, shoring up supply chains in a volatile global market, responding to the security wake-up call of war on the continent, and working with allies to set the norms and standards that will govern emerging technologies.

In conclusion, the EU’s overall trajectory is one of proactive and strategic engagement with technology as a means to secure its future in a changing world. By investing in home-grown innovation, setting high regulatory standards, and deepening international cooperation, Europe is positioning itself as a formidable, values-driven tech power. The road ahead is not without obstacles – from global competition to internal coordination – but the strides made in recent years suggest that the EU is increasingly equipped to advance its technological resources and interests on the world stage. The coming decade will test the effectiveness of these strategies, as rapid tech developments and geopolitical shifts continue to redefine the parameters of global leadership. Europe’s answer, as unfolding now, is to remain united, principled, and innovative in harnessing technology for both prosperity and strategic resilience.

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